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A successful agreement on agriculture is critical for an overall agreement under 
the Doha negotiations. But before the final agreement is known, some critical decisions 
must be made about issues such as resumption of the negotiations, and the key tradeoffs 
to be made following resumption. We consider four of the most controversial areas of the 
agricultural negotiations: the relative importance of domestic support, market access and 
export subsidies; the sensitive-product exceptions sought for all countries; the additional 
special product exceptions sought for developing countries; and the proposed special 
safeguard mechanism. We show that the decisions made on reform in these areas will 
have a critical influence on whether the negotiations achieve their objectives of 
promoting trade reform and reducing poverty. In the end, we are cautiously optimistic 
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The negotiations on agriculture under the WTO’s current Doha Development 
Agenda (DDA), like in the previous GATT rounds of multilateral trade negotiations, have 
encountered major difficulties over many years. Because of the complexity of the issues 
involved in agricultural trade reform, negotiations under Article 20 of the Uruguay 
Round Agreement on Agriculture began in early 2000, almost two years before the Doha 
Ministerial at which a broader Round of negotiations was initiated (WTO 2004a). 
Building on these negotiations, the Doha Ministerial declaration in September 2001 
specified goals for agriculture of increasing market access; reducing, with a view to 
phasing out, export subsidies; and making substantial reductions in domestic support. 
However, the deadlines in 2003 for “modalities” and draft commitments were missed, 
and the Ministerial Conference in September 2003 at Cancún, ended in disarray. A new 
framework agreement was reached on 1 August 2004, but only limited progress was 
made by the Hong Kong Ministerial at the end of 2005, and the negotiations were 
suspended in July 2006.  
A critical decision facing WTO members in 2007 is whether to push forward with 
these negotiations. Key inputs to members’ decisions presumably will be assessments of 
whether the potential gains are sufficiently large and widely enough distributed relative to 
any (political or economic) costs to provide a basis for an outcome that would command 
consensus at the WTO, and whether it is likely that the negotiations will ultimately be 
able to secure these potential gains, given the ambivalence towards trade reform in 
Brussels, Washington, new Delhi and numerous other capitals. In the terminology of 
WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy, a key question – before negotiations can take off 
again – is whether the shape of a landing zone can be discerned.    2 
At this point, many things about outcomes potentially available from the 
negotiations are unknown. However, some key decisions about the outcome may need to 
be taken quite quickly when parameters become available. For instance, it appears likely 
that an outline of a potential agreement between the main players may not be available 
until late February or early March 2006, and yet decisions about continuation of Trade 
Promotion Authority in the United States will likely need to be taken in March. If 
analysts wait until all the information needed to make an informed decision is available, 
it may be too late to assist the process. Under these circumstances, it is useful to take 
stock of the information that is currently available about the potential shape of an 
agreement, and to attempt to provide some approaches to thinking about the key 
uncertainties that remain.  
In this paper, we examine some of the key issues involved in the negotiations that 
will likely be relevant to decisions about their continuation. To this end, we first examine 
the broad features of the proposals for reform of agricultural trade currently under 
discussion. We then consider three of the most controversial areas of the agricultural 
negotiations: the relative importance of market access, domestic support and export 
subsidies; market access issues such as the sensitive-product exceptions sought for all 
countries, the additional special product exceptions sought for developing countries, and 
the proposed special safeguard mechanism; and then domestic support issues. Some 




The broad shape of a potential agreement 
 
While much is not known about the shape of a potential agreement, a great deal 
has been agreed, and the range of possibilities for other features of the agreement is 
spanned by proposals from different WTO members. In this situation, much can be done 
to organize our ignorance in a way that will allow informed assessments to be made more 
quickly once additional information about the shape of a potential agreement is available.     3 
Key features of a potential WTO agreement on agriculture include: a complete 
phase out of export subsidies, reductions in WTO-bound tariffs under the market access 
pillar, and reductions in WTO-bound domestic support.  
The one pillar that looks relatively straightforward is export subsidies, where the 
agreement to completely abolish these measures was reached at the Hong Kong 
Ministerial in late 2005. Subsidies under this pillar have been relatively minor in recent 
years compared with in the 1980s’ lead-up to the GATT’s Uruguay Round (Hoekman 
and Messerlin 2006), so we will not focus on this reform in detail. It is worth noting that 
developing countries have pushed hard for the abolition of these subsidies. Their 
perceptions of the damage to the health and legitimacy of the trading system from these 
measures apparently have outweighed the short-term gains some of those developing 
countries have received (in terms of foreign currency savings) from buying those 
subsidized exports. Bringing agriculture into line with non-agricultural goods by making 
farm export subsidies illegal would be a major achievement in and of itself. 
The likely reduction in actual applied agricultural tariffs that might result from the 
DDA is particularly difficult to assess since not only is the depth of cuts unknown, but 
also countries will have flexibilities to subject some tariff lines to reduced disciplines on 
bound tariffs.  
Similarly, assessment of the implications of disciplines on domestic support is 
complicated by the critical role not just of overall reductions in domestic support, but of 
caps on support to specific commodities. However, recent research allows us to form 
some structured assessment of the likely implications of these key features of potential 
agreements, particularly now that analysts’ databases include both the bound and the 
applied levels of domestic support and bilateral tariffs rates.  
One very early point of agreement in the negotiations was on the use of formula 
approaches for negotiating improvements in market access, domestic support and export 
subsidies. This agreement perhaps reflects the need for more structured procedures than 
prevailed in some of the earlier negotiations under the GATT, when a smaller number of 
members found it more practical/desirable to negotiate on a request-and-offer basis. It 
may also reflect the limited success of request-and-offer negotiations relative to formula-
based negotiations in achieving liberalization. Baldwin (1987, pp. 42-3) notes that the    4 
second through to the fifth multilateral negotiating rounds yielded tariff reductions of 
only 2.5 percent per round, as against 35 percent in the Kennedy Round of the 1960s and 
30 percent in the Tokyo Round of the 1970s. The use of the formula approach provides a 
better basis for ex ante analysis than is possible in a request-an-offer negotiation, or in 
one based on a general rule such as the 36 percent average-cut formulation adopted in the 
Uruguay Round. 
Before we can evaluate any proposals, we need to have some idea of the relative 
potential importance of the three different pillars of the negotiations: market access 
(tariffs); domestic support (direct subsidies); and export subsidies. Absent this, we cannot 
begin to estimate the implications of an overall package. 
 
 
The relative importance of the three ‘pillars’ 
 
A continuing issue for negotiators is the need to strike a balance between the 
effort devoted to the three different pillars of the negotiations—market access, domestic 
support, and export competition. One surprising feature of the debate on this balance has 
been—in our view—a persistent tendency to over-emphasize the gains that might be 
obtained from disciplines on domestic support. A recent EC newsletter on agricultural 
trade policy (European Commission 2006) sets out to “explode the myths surrounding 
world trade”. First among these purported myths is a widely-quoted World Bank research 
result, first publicized in Anderson and Martin (2005) and since explored in detail in 
Anderson, Martin and Valenzuela (2006), that market access barriers are overwhelmingly 
important as a source of potential costs from global agricultural trade barriers. 
The EC paper draws on a USDA study (2001, p. 6) which reports that market 
access contributes 54 percent of the impact of global liberalization, domestic support 32 
percent and export subsidies 10 percent. It compares these results with World Bank 
estimates putting the contribution of market access barriers at 93 percent and an OECD 
(2006) study that puts it at 79 percent. The problem with this comparison is that it does 
not compare like with like. The cited USDA numbers refer to the impact of reform on 
international food prices, whereas the World Bank result refers to the impact on global    5 
economic welfare. Later in the USDA report (2001, p. 37), numbers are provided on 
global welfare impacts, suggesting that tariffs account for 89 percent of potential global 
gains and export subsidies for 1 percent – very close to the more-recent World Bank 
estimates.  
We think that it is preferable to consider the impact of the policy instruments on 
welfare, rather than on international prices. Welfare measures take into account the full 
impact of a policy change on the economy— through changes in the costs faced by 
consumers, through the net returns to producers, and through changes in government 
revenues. While world price impacts are important, their effects on various countries’ 
national economic welfare depend on the situation of the country: increases in world 
prices generally make exporting countries better off, while making importing countries 
worse off, so it is not easy to infer the impact on developing countries as a group.  
A set of comparable results for welfare impacts is shown in Table 1. From that 
table, it is clear that the three studies are consistent in indicating that market access 
barriers are overwhelmingly important as potential sources of welfare gains from reform. 
Because of small but important differences in their models, databases and parameter 
values, they differ somewhat on the importance of Domestic Support. But the policy-
relevant conclusion, that market access increases are much more important than domestic 
support reductions in their potential to generate global welfare gains, is consistent across 
all three studies. 
Further, this result is not just an artifact of the computable general equilibrium 
models used in these studies. The general point that domestic subsidies are likely to be 
much less important than market access barriers was first highlighted by Snape (1987, 
1991) early in the Uruguay Round. He pointed out that subsidies are likely to be much 
less important than market access barriers because subsidies involve outlays by treasuries 
and must pass the scrutiny of annual budget reviews, while tariffs usually generate 
government revenue and are subjected to review much less frequently.  
Hoekman, Ng and Olarreaga (2004), using a simpler partial equilibrium 
framework and extremely detailed information on tariffs plus official WTO data on 
domestic subsidies, also established the importance of agricultural market access barriers. 
Their findings were even stronger than the Anderson, Martin and Valenzuela (2006)    6 
results cited above. They found that reductions in domestic support would yield less than 
one percent of the gains obtainable from reductions in market access barriers. 
Because of the controversy surrounding the World Bank numbers, the 
Anderson/Martin/Valenzuela study (recently published in the WTO’s own refereed 
journal) was designed to provide more intuition into the basis for this repeated research 
finding. To ensure transparency, they used widely available data and began with an 
extremely simple back-of-the-envelope model. Their results confirmed the overwhelming 
importance of market access found in the earlier studies. The main determinants of their 
finding were the much greater importance of tariffs as a form of support, and the fact that 
domestic subsidies distort only production while tariffs distort both production and 
consumption. While domestic support contributed almost 40 percent of OECD support to 
primary agriculture, it was much less important for the agricultural processing activities 
that are also covered by the WTO negotiations. Further, non-OECD countries provide 
much less of their support to primary and processed agriculture in the form of budget-
busting domestic subsidies than do OECD countries. Overall, they estimated even with 
their simple back-of-the-envelope model that domestic subsidies accounted for less than 
15 percent of global support to agriculture. 
Despite these results, we are in full agreement that domestic support should not be 
ignored in the Doha negotiations. Domestic support turns out to be extremely important 
for some products of great interest to developing countries. This is particularly so for 
cotton, where Anderson and Valenzuela (2006) estimate that abolishing domestic 
subsidies on cotton would provide almost 80 percent of the $147 billion in total welfare 
gains to Sub-Saharan Africa from cotton market reform. There is also a systemic risk that 
restraints on market access barriers unaccompanied by restraints on domestic support 
could lead some high-income countries to replace market access barriers with distorting 
domestic support.  
A better interpretation of the policy message of these results is surely that 
reductions in domestic support cannot, alone, be expected to realize very much of the 
potential global trade and welfare gains sought from the negotiations (WTO 2001, para 
2), and that achieving improvements in market access is extremely important for a 
successful outcome in these negotiations.    7 
 
 
Market access issues 
 
The recent report by the Chairman of the negotiations on agriculture (WTO 2006) 
provides an indication of the points of agreement, and of difference, in the negotiations. 
A key point of agreement is on a tiered or banded formula, under which the cuts in higher 
tariffs are higher than the cuts in lower tariffs. This agreement is important from the 
viewpoint of economic efficiency, since the cost of a tariff rises with the square of its 
rate, so that reducing higher tariffs is sure to generate greater economic gains than a 
similar-sized cut to lower tariffs. It is also important in that it rules out an important route 
to avoidance of disciplines during the Uruguay Round—making larger reductions in 
lower tariffs in order to attain a target average-cut in tariffs. The choice of four bands 
allows for progressive increases in the rate of cut on tariffs, while reducing, relative to a 
two- or three-band solution, the potential problems of discontinuities associated with 
changes in the cut to tariffs (Jean, Laborde and Martin 2006).  
Major sources of contention regarding the negotiations on market access involve 
the depth of tariff cuts in these four bands, and the placement of their boundaries. Three 
key proposals made in October 1995, and still relevant to the current bilateral 
negotiations, are those of the European Commission, the G-20 group of developing 
countries, and the United States. As is evident in Table 2, these differ in the placement of 
the bands, and in the depth of the proposed cuts. The EC proposal involved higher limits 
on the bands, and hence application of the higher tariff cuts to a smaller proportion of 
tariffs, and lower cuts within each band. The G-20 formula was more aggressive, with 
slightly lower boundaries for the tariff bands and higher cuts in each band. The US 
proposal was the most aggressive, with lower boundaries for the bands, and higher cuts 
within each band. In addition to the formula, each of these proposals involved a tariff cap. 
In the high-income countries, the EC and the G-20 specified 100 percent, while the 
United States specified 75 percent. For the developing countries, the EC and the G-20 
specified 150 percent.    8 
Given the complexity of these tiered formulas, their impacts are frequently 
summarized by their impact on a measure comparable with the Uruguay Round result—
the average-cut in tariffs.
1 On this measure, the proposed G-20 formula without 
exceptions or a tariff cap would result in a cut of almost 52 percent in EU bound tariffs—
almost one and a half times the comparable measure in the Uruguay Round (36 percent), 
even before allowing for the understatement arising from this measure in the Doha 
context, where it ignores the fact that the largest cuts are being made in the highest tariffs. 
For most countries, the cut in the average bound tariff is considerably larger than the 
average-cut. The cut in the average applied rate is frequently considerably smaller, 
however, because of the presence of binding overhang-- that is gaps between the bound 
tariff rate and the applied rate.  
Turning to the formula for developing countries, it is clear that this involves 
smaller cuts in any given tariff, both because of the broader bands and the smaller cuts in 
tariffs within each band. The fact that developing country tariff bindings are generally 
higher than those of the industrial countries means that the cuts in their average bindings 
are larger than might be suggested by simple comparison of the G-20 developing and 
developed country formulas. The proportionality principle enunciated in the framework 
guiding these negotiations since 1 August 2004 requires that the tariff cuts in developing 
countries should be smaller than those in industrial countries (WTO 2004b, para 40). In 
the few cases covered by the simulations produced by WTO members, the resulting 
average-cut in the tariffs of major developing countries is between 2/3 of the cut resulting 
from the G-20 formula and 2/3 of the cut resulting from application of the EC formula to 
industrial countries. 
The degree of binding overhang is typically greater in developing countries than 
in industrial countries
2 (Jean, Laborde and Martin 2006, p. 91). This means that even a 
comparable cut in tariff bindings in industrial and developing countries implies a smaller 
reduction in developing than in developed countries. Further, these impacts are very 
different both between commodities and between countries. One important complicating 
                                                 
1 In the context of the Uruguay Round, this measure overstated the extent of improvement in market access, 
since countries were allowed to make larger cuts in smaller tariffs. In the context of the Doha agenda, the 
average-cut understates the improvement in market access since the higher cuts are made in higher tariffs.  
2 Binding overhand in the high-income countries averages 18.5 percent of the binding, while it averages 44 
percent of the binding in developing countries.    9 
factor for dealing with this problem is the fact that some countries, and notably China, 
have very little binding overhang and, hence, cuts in bound tariffs translate into much 
sharper reductions in their agricultural tariffs than in countries with greater binding 
overhang.  
As is typically the case in a formula-based trade negotiation, a great deal of 
attention has focused on the flexibilities and exceptions to be permitted from the agreed 
disciplines under the formula. As noted by Francois and Martin (2003), a tariff-reduction 
formula is inherently arbitrary. It therefore seems likely that allowing some flexibility to 
account for the particular interests and concerns of importing countries may allow a 
greater degree of liberalization than would be feasible in the absence of flexibilities—but 
only if the cuts in the formula are deeper by a sufficiently large amount as to overcome 
the diminution of market access resulting from use of the flexibilities.
3 The key challenge 
for negotiators is to identify an approach to defining and treating flexibilities that will 
lead to this felicitious outcome, and avoid unintended the sharp losses in market access 
that can arise from seemingly-modest amounts of flexibility (Jean, Laborde and Martin 
2006). 
There are essentially three broad areas of flexibility under discussion—sensitive 
products to be available to all countries; special products to be available to developing 
countries only; and a special safeguard mechanism that would allow developing countries 




The approach to flexibilities taken under the Doha agenda is more promising than 
that in the Tokyo Round, where products were exempted from liberalization by being 
withdrawn from liberalization (Baldwin 1987). Under the Doha agenda, the treatment of 
sensitive products, in particular, has been constrained by the requirement that “substantial 
improvements in market access should be achieved for all products” (WTO 2004b, p. A-
6). This has required that at least some cuts be made even in products deemed 
                                                 
3 Anderson and Neary (2006) show that there are important differences between the tariff reductions that 
increase welfare and those that increase market access.    10 
“sensitive”. A key challenge when dealing with flexibilities is to ensure that they do not 
eliminate the liberalization that is the objective of the negotiations. There is a number of 
approaches to ensuring this, with one of the most obvious being the number or percentage 
of tariff lines on which smaller reductions can be undertaken. Another potentially 
important restriction is restrictions based on the share of imports covered or, as in the 
case of developing-country non-agricultural flexibilities, on both the number of tariff 
lines and the share of imports (WTO 2004b, p. B-2).  The size of the tariff cuts on 
sensitive products is another important parameter, whether specified in absolute terms or 
as a percentage of the formula cut. Another potentially important factor is whether the 
tariff caps included in the formula specifications should apply to sensitive products. A 
final parameter affecting the degree of liberalization achieved is whether liberalization 
should include expansion of any tariff-rate-quotas applying to sensitive products.  
In the initial phases of the negotiations, very few of the parameters for sensitive 
products were defined. Analysis of the potential impact of sensitive products reported in 
Anderson and Martin (2006) made clear that the number of tariff lines alone was unlikely 
to be sufficient to achieve a reasonable balance between flexibility and discipline. This 
problem is illustrated starkly in Figure 1, which shows the cut in the weighted average 
EU applied tariff relative to the share of tariff lines treated as sensitive. This graph is 
based on the “tiered-formula” used in Anderson and Martin (2006), and assumes no 
liberalization of sensitive products. The products to be classified as sensitive are chosen 
based on the extent to which the reductions in bound tariffs cut applied tariffs, and the 
importance of the products as imports.  
With zero sensitive products, Figure 1 shows that the average tariff would be 
reduced by 40 percent under these assumptions. As the percentage of sensitive products 
allowed rises, the cut in the average tariff declines very rapidly. Strikingly, with one 
percent of products exempted, the cut in the average tariff falls by half. With ten percent 
of products exempted, the cut falls to an eighth of its original level. The reason for this 
striking finding is very simple: some tariff lines are much more important than others in 
terms of their potential contribution to improvements in market access. The important 
goods for this purpose tend to be those on goods that are major imports, for which 
applied tariffs are initially high, and for which there is little gap between bound and    11 
applied tariff rates. As Figure 1 makes clear, it would be extremely difficult to contain the 
adverse impact on market access of completely excluding products from liberalization 
simply by restricting the number of products excluded—especially since the range for the 
percentage of products to be treated as sensitive was from 1 to 15 percent (WTO 2006, p. 
4). This suggests that it is important to focus not just on the number of tariff lines treated 
as sensitive, but also on the treatment of these products—a range that extended from 20 
to 70 percent in the draft modalities (WTO 2006).  
In this respect there appears to have been considerable progress in the 
negotiations. The EC, which has been the primary demandeur on sensitive products, has 
indicated a willingness to make substantially greater efforts to reduce tariffs on these 
goods than seemed likely at an earlier stage. Tariff reductions of 50 percent of the 
formula cut, together with an expansion of TRQs based on 80 percent of the foregone 
price reduction have been discussed. A major concern with this formulation is that, at 
least in its initial version, it assumed an elasticity of import demand of -1, a value far 
below the usual range of estimates at the tariff line level. For example, Hummels and 
Klenow (2005) cite a range from -5 to -10 for this elasticity at the six-digit level. If 
adjusted for a more appropriate value of the import demand elasticity, however, this 
approach would appear to provide much more market access than seemed likely at an 
earlier stage of the negotiations. A range of proposals for TRQ expansion has been put 
forward, including some based on shares of domestic consumption as well as on initial 
shares of consumption. 
Two other key elements of flexibility are reserved for developing countries. The 
first is special products (SPs), and the second the special safeguard mechanism (SSM), 




Special products appear to be intended to deal with the problems for the 
livelihoods of small producers in developing countries. The best articulated proposal of 
this nature focuses on improving food security, livelihood security and rural 
development. Some criteria include that the product be a staple food, that it have large    12 
shares in food expenditure in the country, and that it be produced by subsistence farmers. 
In general, in trade negotiations, flexibilities are agreed in the expectation that they will 
allow deeper cuts through the formula for negotiations. If, however, products are special, 
then it is less obvious that their exclusion would require a compensating increase in the 
ambition of the formula. 
Some have expressed concerns that protection policy for such products may 
reduce the food and livelihood security of many poor people, while seeking to improve 
the income situation of farmers who are net sellers of food products. This concern arises 
from the fact that poor people in poor countries are known to have extremely high 
expenditure shares on food—Cranfield, Hertel and Preckel (2006) estimate that, for the 
poorest households, this share is 73 percent of total expenditure. At the same time, 
subsistence farmers tend to focus on production of staples for their own consumption. If a 
poor, subsistence-oriented person has an income from grain production valued at $100 at 
world prices – but consumes $90 worth of grain and sells only $10 worth of grain – then 
raising the price by 10 percent will only increase household income by $1. By contrast, it 
would reduce the income of a poor household that needed to buy all of its staple foods by 
$7.30. The exact numbers will depend on the situation of the specific country, and it may 
be that, for some products in some countries, use of these flexibilities would reduce 
poverty and improve livelihood security. It is desirable therefore to evaluate this effect 
empirically rather than simply to assume that protection policies would improve 
livelihood security.  
A preliminary analysis by Ivanic and Martin (2006) presented to a World Bank 
seminar on October 17, 2006, which has benefited from substantial criticism and 
suggestions for improvement, found that food price policies that raise the prices of 
importable staple foods above the levels that would otherwise have prevailed would raise 
poverty in most of the countries considered. Their study focuses very simply on the effect 
of changes in policies affecting the domestic prices of food, ignoring changes in world 
prices on the grounds that it is examining unilateral changes in the policies in individual, 
small countries. For reasons of data and timing, the study covers only four poor countries: 
Nicaragua, Pakistan, Vietnam and Vietnam. However, there is considerable evidence 
(Christiaensen and Demery 2006; Jaramillo and Lederman 2006) that, in a wide range of    13 
poor countries, most poor households, including poor rural households, are net buyers of 
food. Some of these households are farm families who choose to use their limited 
resources to produce some cash crops in addition to food. Others are simply poor net 
consumers dependent on non-farm sources of income.   
Unfortunately, none of the studies designed to provide an analytical framework 
for selection of special products appears to have considered the impacts of protecting 
staple foods on the food and livelihood security of poor households. Some of these 
studies even conclude that a higher expenditure share for a staple food should make it 
more suitable for treatment as a special product, for which protection is potentially 
expected to contribute to income security and food security (Herath 2005).  
Much of the policy analysis supporting proposals for special products appears to 
be based on a presumption, from detailed studies of episodes of liberalization such as that 
undertaken for rice in Vietnam, that raising agricultural prices would reduce poverty, and 
hence improve income and food security. Ivanic and Martin (2006) also find that raising 
the price of rice in Vietnam would lower poverty. This reflects a number of factors 
including the fact that Vietnam is a net exporter of rice, and that farming resources are 
widely distributed. This case of a net exporter has no real relevance to the special 
products debate, since protection cannot be expected to raise the price of an exportable 
good. Another argument advanced by proponents is that studies of global liberalization 
find that world agricultural trade liberalization causes food prices to rise, and poverty to 
fall in Latin American countries (Morley and Pineiro 2004). But this argument ignores 
the fact that the Latin American countries that were the focus of the Morley-Pineiro study 
are generally net exporters of agricultural products, and that the Morley-Pineiro study 
includes the gains to poor people resulting from the liberalization of developing 
countries’ trade barriers that is an inherent part of their global liberalization  experiment. 
Another concern about special-product exceptions has come from developing 
country exporters of agricultural products, such as Thailand, Malaysia, Paraguay, 
Uruguay and Argentina. These countries note that south-south trade has been the most 
rapidly-growing part of world agricultural trade (Aksoy and Beghin 2005), and are 
concerned that extensive use of special product exceptions might reduce their 
opportunities to participate in further growth.     14 
For the reasons outlined above, we are concerned about the risk that raising the 
prices of staple foods is more likely to increase poverty in poor countries than to lower it. 
We recognize that this need not always be the outcome. A key finding of the major study 
on trade and poverty by Hertel and Winters (2006) was that the relationship between 
trade reform and poverty is very complex, although there was a general tendency for 
greater liberalization to result in poverty reductions. Another key finding was the 
potential importance of complementary policies in influencing poverty reduction 
outcomes.  
Another insight into the matter comes from the earlier literature on the evolution 
of agricultural trade policies with economic development. As noted by Anderson and 
Hayami (1986) and Lindert (1991), governments tend to respond to changes in the 
interests of particular groups as the economy evolves. At low income levels, basic foods 
have high expenditures shares for the influential urban population. By contrast, the 
relatively large farm population is much less effectively organized, and has less interest 
in the price of food precisely because poor farmers are subsistence-oriented, typically 
selling only a small share of their output in the market, and relying only on a limited 
degree on purchased inputs. However, as countries grow, both of these factors change, 
and the power of farm interests increases relative to urban interests. Urban consumers 
become more numerous and harder to organize, and begin to be less concerned about the 
price of food as its share of their expenditure falls. Farmers become less numerous, and 
hence easier to organize, and also become more commercially oriented, and hence more 
concerned about food prices. With the rapid economic development in many of today’s 
developing countries, there is a risk that exceptions given now will result in higher 
protection in future, as the relative power of the farm lobby increases. 
 
Market access with and without sensitive and special product exceptions 
 
A careful evaluation of the impact of proposed market access reforms shows that 
their impact on tariff rates is strongly influenced by both binding overhang and by the 
flexibilities under discussion. To illustrate this, we consider a tariff simulation based on 
the G-20 formula discussed above, and examine its impact on average applied tariffs in a    15 
wide range of countries. While the application of the formula to the bound tariff rates is 
relatively straightforward, the country exceptions and the flexibilities require explanation. 
In accordance with the Framework Agreement (WTO 2004b), the least developed 
countries are not required to make reductions. In accordance with the Hong Kong 
Ministerial Declaration, a group of Small and Vulnerable economies is permitted 
flexibility, here interpreted as being required to make no tariff reductions. Regarding 
flexibilities, all countries are assumed to be able to treat four percent of their products as 
sensitive, subject to tariff cuts equal to 50 percent of the formula cut.
4 If these products 
are covered by a Tariff-Rate-Quota, then we assume that TRQ expansion adds an 
additional element of liberalization, equal to 66 percent of the formula tariff cut. We 
assume that developing countries are permitted to treat 10 percent of their agricultural 
tariff lines as special products subject to no liberalization.
5 These products are selected 
from an indicative list of products identified by ICTSD (2005) as likely to meet the 
criteria for special product treatment. This set of commodities was ranked by the extent to 
which tariff revenues would fall following application of the formula, and the largest 
tariff-loss items selected first, until the 10 percent limit was reached. After completing 
the process of identifying special products, attention turned to sensitive products, which 
were again chosen according to the loss of tariff revenue associated with these products.  
Given the procedures outlined in Table 3, the bound tariffs were cut according to 
the formula and other rules identified. The impacts on applied rates were determined on 
the assumption that applied rates are reduced only where the new bound rate is below the 
initial applied rate.  
The resulting tariff levels presented in Table 4 highlight several important 
features of the G-20 formula and its implications for applied tariffs. The first is that the 
formula alone, without flexibilities, would imply quite sizeable cuts in applied tariffs in 
the industrial countries. The average applied tariff on agricultural and food products in 
high income countries falls by exactly half, from 15.8. to 7.9 percent. Average applied 
tariffs are cut by more than half in the EU/EFTA, from 13.7 percent to 6.4 percent and in 
Japan, from 29.2 to 12 percent. Tariffs are cut by less than half in the United States, from 
                                                 
4 The 4 percent is half of the 8 percent of tariff lines sought by the EU, the demandeur on this issue. 
5 The G-33 is seeking sensitive product status for 20 percent of its tariff lines.    16 
2.4 to 1.7 percent partly because the tiered formula requires smaller cuts in lower tariffs. 
Applied tariffs are cut substantially in the Republic of Korea and Taiwan (China), from 
53.1 to 34.6 percent, a reduction of 35 percent. These cuts are smaller than in other high-
income economies because they are able to self-designate as developing economies, and 
hence receive more lenient treatment.  
The reductions in applied tariff rates required by the formula are much smaller in 
developing economies than in the developed. For low- and middle-income countries as a 
group, the reduction in average tariffs is from 13.9 to 12.5 percent, a cut of roughly 10 
percent. The main contributors to this small cut in tariffs are the more-lenient nature of 
the formula for developing countries (including both the placement of the bands and the 
size of the cuts), and the greater degree of binding overhang in developing countries. 
China has one of the largest tariff reductions of developing country members, from an 
applied rate of 10.4 to 7.8 percent, a reduction of 2.6 percentage points or 25 percent of 
the initial tariff level. This relatively large cut reflects the lack of binding overhang in 
China’s tariff schedule. Thailand, also, has a larger-than-average tariff reduction, because 
of limited binding overhang and relatively high agricultural tariffs.  
Many developing countries are required by the G-20 formula only to make quite 
small reductions in agricultural tariffs. In India, the reduction would be from 49.8 to 46.1 
percent, a cut of 7.5 percent of the initial tariff rate. Bangladesh, as an LDC, would not be 
required to make any cuts. For South Asia as a whole, the reduction would be from 33.7 
percent to 31.9 percent, a cut of just over 5 percent of the initial tariff. In Sub-Saharan 
Africa, the average reduction would be from 17.3 to 16.7 percent, a cut of 3.5 percent 
from the initial tariff rate.  
The use of flexibilities, in column 3 of Table 4, has quite different impacts on the 
different economies and groups. Even though the high-income countries are much more 
restricted in their use of flexibilities—having access only to sensitive product treatment, 
and not to the stronger flexibilities for special products—they are likely to derive much 
more political “benefit” from these flexibilities. With sensitive product provisions, the 
high-income countries would be able to make much smaller cuts in their tariffs. Instead 
of having to halve their tariffs, going from 15.8 to 7.9 percent, they would need to reduce 
their tariffs only to 12.3 percent, a cut of 22 percent instead of 50 percent. These    17 
flexibilities would have a particularly large impact in Japan, where the tariff cut would 
decline from 59 percent to 28 percent. 
In developing countries, the flexibility provisions have a much smaller impact on 
tariffs than in the high-income countries. When flexibilities are permitted, the post-
formula tariff rises from 12.5 to 13.7 percent. While the cut in the average tariff falls 
from 10 percent to 1.5 percent, this is a change of only 1.2 percentage points in the size 
of the cut, as compared with 4.4 percentage points in the high-income countries. 
This may seem, at first sight, surprising, since developing countries are, under our 
assumptions, permitted to completely exclude up to 10 percent of tariff lines as special 
products, and to take advantage of the same sensitive product provisions as the high-
income countries. There are, however, two likely contributing factors. One is the much 
lower level of cuts in applied rates noted above. With cuts that are so much smaller than 
in the high-income countries, it is perhaps not surprising that the flexibilities would have 
a smaller impact. Another likely contributing factor is smaller variation in the tariff 
structures of developing countries relative to high-income countries.  
 
Special safeguard mechanism 
 
The Uruguay Round agreement on Agriculture provided countries that had 
converted their non-tariff barriers into tariffs through the process of tariffication access to 
a special safeguard (SSG) for these products. An effect of this was to allow most high-
income countries access to this contingent protection measure. Developing countries, by 
contrast, rarely had access to this measure since they rarely used the tariffication 
provisions, and generally made use of the option for “ceiling” bindings. The Hong Kong 
Ministerial Declaration (WTO 2005, p. A6) indicates agreement to include an special 
safeguard mechanism (SSM) with a quantity trigger designed to provide temporary 
protection in response to import “surges”.  
It is clear that price volatility can be a serious problem, particularly for producers 
with inadequate access to finance for intertemporal smoothing of consumption. However, 
one must be aware that safeguard instruments focused on import “surges” are not 
necessarily synonymous with revenue stabilization. Whether they are or not depends on    18 
the source of the shocks and on the elasticity parameters in the markets involved. They 
might be so if the shocks are exclusively from exogenous world prices, but need not be so 
if the shocks arise from domestic sources such as crop yields, and certainly will not be so 
if the import surges arise from variations in domestic demand.  
Another important point to consider is the risk that such schemes will be captured 
by vested interests. The history of price stabilization schemes is replete with schemes 
whose avowed purpose was to stabilize, but whose actual effect was largely to raise 
prices (perhaps EU intervention policies, or the Australian wool reserve price scheme) or 
to lower them (perhaps many commodity boards in Africa) depending on the power of 
the dominant interest groups involved. This history suggests a need for caution in the 
design of such an instrument if it is not to lead merely to weakening of hard-won WTO 
disciplines whose ultimate role is to reduce the ability of special interests to create trade 
distortions. 
Quantity triggers of the type discussed in G-33 (2006), Paraguay and Uruguay 
(2006) and USA (2006) pose particular dangers for three reasons. The first is the risk that 
they will run counter to the objectives of the mechanism. If implemented—perhaps 
because of interest-group pressure—in response to a shock to domestic demand, they will 
actually destabilize domestic prices and producer revenues. The second is the risk that 
they will allow the market to be closed very frequently, rather than merely under the 
exceptional circumstances envisaged in proposals for such a mechanism. Simulations 
reported by Paraguay and Uruguay (2006) suggest that this could be the case with the 
parameters included in the G-33 proposal. A third risk is of cumulative market closure, 
again perhaps in response to interest group pressures. If a measure is invoked, imports 
can be expected to decline, and the lower level of imports becomes part of the trigger for 
the following three years. This, in turn, makes it easier to invoke the measure in 
subsequent years.  
In addition to these concerns about the impact of an SSM at the individual market 
level, there are concerns about the impact on global markets. If trade expands, or world 
prices fall, it is likely that a number of markets would introduce safeguard measures. A 
consequence of this is likely to be increased instability of world markets. This instability    19 
would, in turn, lead to pressure for more intensive use of safeguards, and hence to further 
increases in world market instability.  
The challenge in this area seems to be to devise an approach that allows the risks 
to be managed in a way that meets the valid concerns of those proposing the SSM with 
the risks of exacerbating distortions to world markets. Doing this will require careful 
attention both to the design of the measures used and to the specification of magnitudes 
such as the quantity price triggers to be adopted. Unfortunately, the current research base 
seems inadequate to meet the needs of policy makers in this area.  
 
 
Domestic support issues 
 
There has been considerable dissatisfaction with the constraints on domestic 
support negotiated under the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture. Part of the 
problem was that the commitment levels negotiated by the USA and the EU in that 
Round were too high, partly because of the choice of base years in the agreement. Part 
was because these constraints only applied to agriculture as a whole, and not to its 
components. Another source of concern was the fact that the de minimis limits for 
product and non-product-specific support were not only substantial (5 percent), but could 
be counted twice, allowing a larger amount of such support than was perhaps originally 
envisaged.   
In addition, it had become clear that one of the intended constraints on domestic 
support had become an escape valve, allowing the industrial countries to vaporize some 
of their support commitments. The intent of the negotiators in including support provided 
by administered prices in the Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS) appears to have been 
a good one—to impose an additional constraint on this form of protection. However, it 
created an opportunity for WTO members to relax their constraints by replacing such 
support by a system, potentially identical in effect, under which prices were not 
administered but managed by indirect support. An administered price could be replaced 
by one simply posted and observed so that policies could be adjusted to support it. Since 
no administered price can be maintained without supporting trade measures, the effective    20 
economic distinction between the two is small. Under WTO law, however, the 
administered price support is included in the AMS while support provided by a trade 
measure is not. As a consequence, countries can remove such support from their current 
estimates of WTO support, while leaving it in the commitments that included this form of 
support.    
Attempts to reform these measures are following the traditional GATT philosophy 
of “the more restrictions the better”.  The latest proposals include restrictions on the 
Aggregate Measure of Support, on the Overall Trade-Distorting Support, on the Blue Box 
(support tied to production-limiting programs), on De Minimis support, and on support to 
individual commodities. 
Proposals by the US, the EU and the G-20 in October 2005 still underpin the 
current negotiations. Brink (2005) provides an excellent introduction to the black art of 
WTO constraints on domestic support. Some key features of these proposals are 
summarized in Table 5. Fortunately a tiered-formula approach to reducing domestic 
support is proposed, such that the largest reductions are to be made in the countries with 
the largest absolute amount of domestic support. 
Figure 2 shows the extent to which committed levels of the Aggregate Measure of 
Support exceed the actual levels, and shows just how much the commitment levels must 
be cut if they are to begin to reduce actual levels of support. It shows that only the USA is 
likely to face substantial cuts in actual support levels under all of the proposals under 
discussion—perhaps part of the reason that it is more defensive in this area of the 
negotiations than in other areas. However, the EU might also need to make reductions in 





There appears to have been significant progress on some of the key parameters in 
the current negotiations under the Doha Development Agenda. If press reports are correct 
in indicating that there is now greater willingness amongst the major industrial countries 
to move on market access and domestic support than was the case when the negotiations    21 
were suspended in mid-2006, then there would appear to be a good basis for the 
resumption of negotiations as announced by the WTO Director-General in early February 
2007. While the headline reductions in tariffs and domestic support are misleading in that 
they overstate the required reductions in actual support, they are nonetheless large 
reductions relative to the reductions achieved in the Uruguay Round. In market access, 
they are also focused on reducing high tariffs, tariff peaks and tariff escalation in ways 
not attempted in the Uruguay Round. In domestic support, they involve critically 
important restrictions on blue box measures and on product-specific support as well as 
substantial headline reductions in total support. In export subsidies the reduction to zero 
that has been agreed to already is an undeniably important achievement.  
The reductions in tariff bindings in developing countries, too, are large relative to 
those undertaken in previous rounds. The proportionality principle leads to them being 
smaller than those in the industrial countries, while the greater binding overhang in 
developing countries leads to their impact on applied tariffs being smaller again. 
Exceptions for least developed countries and small and vulnerable developing economies 
reduce the political pain for – but also the economic gain received by – these countries. 
Proposals for special product exceptions in developing countries allow countries to 
maintain tariffs higher than would be possible in the absence of these flexibilities. If these 
products are chosen according to criteria such as being important staple foods produced 
by subsistence farmers, there is a risk that this will reduce the income security of many 
poor people who are net buyers of food. 
Recent advances in databases and analytical tools mean that we in the research 
community can contribute much more directly to informing policy decisions and 
prospective negotiating positions. This is a very different situation from that prevailing in 
previous rounds, where it was not possible to make useful analytical contributions in the 
later, more detailed, and more contentious stages of these negotiations. We should, 
however, be well aware that such analyses are likely to be deeply controversial. 
Despite the advances that we have made, it is clear that we, as analysts, need to 
work hard to improve our analytical toolkits in this trade policy field. One area where we 
need to go further is in analyzing the impacts of policy reforms on households, and 
particularly on poor households, rather than simply on countries as a whole. Another is to    22 
take into account the dynamic impacts of reform, perhaps using some of the approaches 
developed in work following Melitz (2003) and surveyed in Francois and Martin (2007).  
While much more, and better, analysis is needed once more-definitive offers are 
available, the evidence to date suggests that what is (possibly) within the reach of 
negotiators is a very substantial agreement—much more so than the Uruguay Round 
agreement in terms of cuts both in bound tariffs and subsidies and in actual delivered 
levels of farm protection and support. The potential Doha agreement on agriculture is part 
of a broader agreement including what appears to be a substantial reform of non-
agricultural tariffs plus an as-yet unknown degree of commitment to reform policies 
affecting markets for services. We note and understand that many developing countries 
are cautious about undertaking major liberalization commitments. Our hope is that, when 
deciding what commitments to make, the governments and citizens of those countries 
will at least be aware that economic analyses suggest that deeper liberalization generally 
leads to great income gains and—particularly if accompanied by appropriate 
complementary policies—to greater reductions in poverty. 
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Table 1: Relative impacts on global economic welfare of agricultural trade reform from 




 World  Bank  OECD  USDA 
     
Market  access  93 79 89 
Domestic support  5  19  10 
Export  subsidies  2 2 1 
 
Source: Anderson, Martin and Valenzuela (2006), OECD (2006 and USDA (2001)    28 






High-income countries  Developing countries 
Proposed by:   
EC  G-20  USA  EC & G-20 
Tiers  Cuts  Tiers  Cuts  Tiers   Cuts  Tiers   Cuts 
        end of tier     
0 – 30  45  0 – 20  45  0 – 20  65  0 – 30  25 
30-60  45  20-50  55  20 – 40  75  30 – 80  30 
60-90  50  50-75  65  40 – 60  85  80 – 130  35 












a The US formula differed from the others in involving increasing tariff cuts within bands. 
For simplicity, only the maximum tariff cuts in each tier are shown.  
 
Source: Compiled by the authors, drawing on EC (2005), (G-20 2005), and (USA 2005)     29 
Table 3: Details of various agricultural tariff cut scenarios, various regions
 a 
  
  High-income Developing  LDCs  SVEs 
        
Bands 
 
0/20/50/75  0/30/80/130  no lib  no lib 
Cut – proportional 
 
45/55/65/75 25/30/35/40     
Tariff Cap 
 
100 percent  150 percent     
Sensitive products  4 percent -of tariff lines. Cuts reduced by half 
(tariff revenue criterion). For products with a 
TRQ, the cuts were set at 2/3 of the formula cut 
to incorporate the impact of TRQ expansion 
according to the EU proposal. No cap. 
 
   
Special products  No cut for up to 10 percent of agricultural tariff 
lines taken in the ICTSD sectors (tariff revenue 
criterion). No cap. Where applicable, special 
products are chosen before sensitive products. 
 
   
 
a Republic of Korea treated as a developing country for agriculture; a developed country 
for NAMA reform. LDCs are the 50 countries identified in the UN list of Least 
Developed Countries. The Small and Vulnerable Economies considered  were: Antigua & 
Barbuda, Barbados, Bolivia, Dominica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Fiji, Grenada, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Mauritius, Mongolia, Nicaragua, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, 
Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad and 
Tobago. Paragraph 6 countries (those with less than 35 percent tariff bindings) were 
identified as Cameroon, Congo, Côte d Ivoire, Cuba, Ghana, Kenya, Macau, Mauritius, 
Nigeria, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Zimbabwe 
 
Source; Authors’ compilation   30 
Table 4: Implications of tiered formula cuts for agricultural and processed food tariff 
rates, by region 
(percent) 
  Initial Applied  G-20 Formula  G-20 w/- Exceptions 
World total  15.0 9.8 12.8 
High income countries  15.8 7.9 12.3 
Australia & New Zealand  2.6 1.7 2.2 
EU 25 plus EFTA  13.7 6.4  8.8 
United States  2.4 1.7 2.0 
Canada  9.0 4.5 7.7 
Japan  29.2 12.0 21.1 
Korea and Taiwan  53.1 34.6 52.2 
Hong Kong and Singapore  0.1 0.1 0.1 
Low and middle income countries  13.9 12.5 13.7 
East Asia and Pacific  12.3 10.1 11.9 
China  10.4 7.8  9.8 
Indonesia  5.0 5.0 5.0 
Thailand  17.1 14.7 16.4 
Vietnam*  36.7 36.7 36.7 
Rest of East Asia  12.3 9.4 12.3 
South Asia  33.7 31.9 33.6 
Bangladesh  12.7 12.7 12.7 
India  49.8 46.1 49.6 
Rest of South Asia  21.4 21.4 21.4 
Europe and Central Asia  14.5 13.9 14.4 
Russia*  13.5 13.5 13.5 
Turkey  16.7 14.6 16.6 
Rest of ECA  15.2 14.1 15.1 
Middle East and North Africa  12.5 10.5 12.4 
Sub Saharan Africa  17.3 16.7 17.3 
South Africa  8.6 8.2 8.6 
Selected Sub Saharan Africa  22.4 20.9 22.4 
Rest of Sub Saharan Africa  17.4 17.0 17.3 
Latin America and the Caribbean  9.7 9.2 9.6 
Argentina  6.8 6.6 6.7 
Brazil  5.0 4.9 4.9 
Mexico  10.2 9.1 10.2 
Rest of LAC  10.6 10.4 10.5 
Rest of the World  12.6 12.3 12.3 
WTO developing countries  16.6  13.7  16.4 
Middle income countries  11.9  10.4  11.7 
Low income countries  21.8  20.9  21.8 
 
*Excluded from the liberalization scenario as they were not members when the scenario 
was developed. This table draws on joint work with David Laborde of CEPII and 
Dominique van der Mensbrugghe of the World Bank. 
 
Source: Authors’ simulations with detailed tariff data from CEPII    31 
Table 5: Domestic support proposals by the US, the EU and the G-20 as of October 2005 
(percent) 
 
 USA  EU  G-20 
AMS     
EU  83 70 80 
Japan  83 60+ 80 
USA  60 60 70 
Canada  37 50 60 
Brazil ?  ?  60 
 
OTDS 
   
EU  75 70 80 
Japan 53  ?  75 
USA  53 60 75 
Canada  31 50 70 
Brazil  ? ? ? 
     
Cut de minimis by:  50  80  Adjust to overall 
cap 
Cap on Blue  2.5  5  5 
 
Source: Authors’ compilation based on Brink (2005)    32 
 
Figure 1: Impact of altering the proportion of sensitive products on the reduction in 
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Note: The shaded portion of the bars shows the gap between the maximum commitment 
levels, and actual support levels. 
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